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Abstract The question whether qualities are metaphysically more fundamental
than or mere limiting cases of relations can be addressed in an applied symbolic
logic. There exists a logical equivalence between qualitative and relational predi-
cations, in which qualities are represented as one-argument-place property predi-
cates, and relations as more-than-one-argument-place predicates. An interpretation
is first considered, according to which the logical equivalence of qualitative and
relational predications logically permits us ontically to eliminate qualities in favor
of relations, or relations in favor of qualities. If metaphysics is understood at least in
part as an exercise in ontic economy, then we may be encouraged to adopt a
property ontology of qualities without quality-irreducible relations, or relations
without relation-irreducible qualities. If either strategy is followed, the choice of
reducing qualities to relations or relations to qualities will need to be justified on
extra-logical grounds. These might include a perceived greater intuitiveness,
explanatory fecundity, compatibility with cognitive ontogeny or developmental
psychology, expressive or explanatory elegance or cumbersomeness, and an open-
ended list of philosophical motivations that could reasonably favor the ontic pri-
oritization of qualities over relations or relations over qualities. Despite its intuitive
appeal, the thesis that logical equivalence together with extra-logical preferences
justifies unidirectional ontic reduction of relations to qualities or qualities to rela-
tions is rejected in light of the more defensible proposition that the logical equiv-
alence of qualitative and relational predications actually supports the opposite
conclusion, that both qualities and relations are logically indispensable to a com-
plete ontology of properties. The logical equivalence of qualitative and relational
predications, insofar as we continue to observe the distinction, makes it logically
necessary ontically for both qualities and relations to exist whenever either one
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exists. That logically equivalent qualitative and relational predications have as their
truth-makers the exemplification by objects of both qualities and relations as equi-
foundational properties further suggests that there is no deeper logical distinction
between qualities and relations, but only two convenient lexical-grammatical des-
ignations for property predications involving one- versus more-than-one-argument-
place.
Keywords Abstraction  Exemplification  Identity  Logic, logical equivalence 
Metaphysics  Ontic reduction  Ontology  Property  Quality  Relation 
Semantics
1 Ontic Reductions
We begin with a slate of questions. Is it possible, and what would it mean, to reduce
qualities to relations and-or relations to qualities? What is the methodology by
which an ontic reduction of qualities to relations (qualities as limiting case relations)
or relations to qualities (relations as internally predicationally complex qualities) is
supposed to be effected? What is the role of logical equivalence in supporting
reductions of qualitative to relational or relational to qualitative predications? How
does predicate syntactical economy generally relate to ontic economy? What should
the logical equivalence of qualitative and relational predications be taken to imply
concerning the ontology and exemplification of qualities and relations? Is the
relation one–one, one–many, many–one, many–many? Are there distinct logical or
other philosophical advantages to be sought in an ontic reduction that eliminates
either the category of qualities or the category of relations from the metaphysics of
properties and the semantics of property predications? What is to be gained, and
what sacrifices might be expected, under the most severe ontic austerity measures?
Given the choice, can we formulate a better properties ontology with only qualities
to the exclusion of quality-irreducible relations, or with only relations to the
exclusion of relation-irreducible qualities? How much can logic contribute to
understanding and managing our metaphysical choices, and about which ontic
matters is logic silent?
We consider an interesting popular interpretation of the logical equivalence of
qualitative and relational predications. The logical equivalence exists, and the
equivalent propositions satisfy the argument-place-number criterion for distinguish-
ing qualitative and relational predications. Although, to be candid, some parts are
only trivially or vacuously qualitative or relational in predicational form. The
interpretation implies that logic offers metaphysics the option of accepting a more
austere ontology of properties consisting only of qualities, excluding relations as a
special condition of objects, or exclusively of relations without qualities, except as
limiting cases of relations. Metaphysics goes beyond logic, but with logic’s
blessing, then, by advancing extra-logical reasons for preferring qualities over
relations or relations over qualities.
We track this apparently reasonable assumption to see where it leads to suppose
that the logical equivalence of qualitative and relational predications presents
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metaphysics with the option of reducing qualities exclusively to relations or
relations exclusively to qualities. The logical equivalence of qualitative and
corresponding relational predication transforms itself has the logical form of a
biconditional, naturally consisting of two conditionals. One conditional, pointing in
one direction, invites the syntactical reduction of relational to qualitative
predications, and the other of qualitative to relational predications. Thus, we can
say everything we need to say about relations in purely qualitative terms, and
similarly for relational variants of anything we may want to say about qualities. If,
given the logical equivalence of qualitative and relational predications, we need
only find respectable extra-logical grounds for preferring qualities over relations or
relations over qualities, then we must look to the question of what sort of extra-
logical arguments might be found or fashioned for reducing relations to qualities or
qualities to relations in a more economical preferred property ontology.
We conclude in the end, despite the intuitive appeal of authorizing ontic
reductions on the strength of logical equivalences, that there are even better reasons
for rejecting the syntactical-to-ontic reduction principle, at least where the ontology
of qualities and relations and the logic and semantics of qualitative and relational
predications are concerned. The syntactical-to-ontic reduction principle is never-
theless sufficiently interesting to warrant careful critical consideration indepen-
dently of the metaphysics of properties. The common ‘Quinean’ strategy of many
logically trained analytic metaphysicians is to identify logical equivalences among
expressions referring to propositions and properties, sets and properties, sets and
propositions, mental and physical states, or the like, and then to interpret the
equivalences as implying that theoretically we need only one of the logically
equivalent propositions and its ontic truth-makers exclusively, without and rather
than or in preference to another ontically redundant terminology.1
(I:1) SYNTACTICAL-TO-ONTIC REDUCTIONISM
Q $ R implies that R-entities are ontically dispensable in deference to Q-entities, and conversely
An ontology of properties can logically be reduced from an ontic domain containing both Q- and R-
entities, to a domain containing only Q- and no R-entities, or, alternatively, to a ontic domain
containing only R- and no Q-entities
The model is seen in, if not self-consciously borrowed from, classical logic,
where it is similarly observed that we can eliminate either ? in favor of _ and :, or
_ in favor of ? and :, on the strength of the logical equivalence, [p ? q] $
[:p _ q]. We thereby simplify a specific more minimal syntax than the usual
generous supply of distinct albeit interdefineable truth functions. The important
question is whether in this case we also thereby effect an ontic reduction in the
number of truth functions. The philosophical problem is how properly to interpret
1 The interpretation of logical equivalence between qualitative and relational predication follows general
Quinean paraphrastic protocols. See Quine (1960, esp. pp. 161, 180–188, 210, 221, 227–228, 250,
258–259). A paradigmatic example of Quine’s method is found in Quine (1964, pp. 209–216), Lambert
(1987).
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the full ontic implications entailed or approved by specific ‘reductive’ applications
of the logical equivalence relation, $. Are we right to think, if such a logical
equivalence holds, then, since in that case we can always say whatever we need or
want to say about one part of the logical equivalence exclusively in terms of the
other logically equivalent part, that therefore we do not need both equivalence-
related concepts in theory or language? Are we otherwise then simply multiplying
names for identical things beyond expressive or explanatory necessity? Or are we
logically stuck, does logic thereafter demand that ontically we must always have
both concepts represented by the two logically equivalent predications whenever we
have either one or the other?
The essential connection between syntactical reform and corresponding ontic
reduction is supposed to be that ontic commitments are made by thinkers when they
accept the truth of theories that are in turn composed of propositions, whose truth-
makers finally presuppose the existence of this or that object exemplifying this or
that property. If we do not need to refer to a certain category of objects or properties
in the true propositions constituting a theory, but can logically equivalently express
whatever relevant truths apply by referring only to the properties of another
category of objects in propositions involving a distinct vocabulary, then it is
reasonable to conclude that we can reduce our ontic commitments to the category of
objects referred to in whatever true propositions minimally logically imply both sets
of propositions. If we can reduce our overall ontic commitment by accepting as true
only those propositions that make reference to qualities exclusively rather than
relations, or to relations rather than qualities, then perhaps we should try to do so.
Not only are we obligated to work toward ontic reductions because it is a
responsibility of metaphysics to keep philosophy’s ontic house in good order, but,
more importantly, as we proceed, for the sake of sharpening our sense of what may
be truly fundamental and essential in analytic metaphysics.
The reliance on logical equivalence as a justification for ontic reduction is
disputable. Reasoning from the reduction of a redundantly opulent to a more austere
logical syntax toward a corresponding ontic reduction resulting in a comparatively
more austere ontology is frequently taken for granted as a philosophical privilege to
be exercised with discretion but at our convenience. We criticize this libertine
expectation, and cast doubt on the prospects of achieving a warranted ontic
reduction from any true logical equivalence. We conclude that the logical
equivalence of qualitative and relational predications in particular does not
logically imply the ontic reduction or collapsing of qualities and relations into a
single category. We maintain that the logical equivalence of qualitative and
relational predications implies instead that both qualities and relations must exist as
two ontically distinct but logically equivalently expressible property subspecies. If
this is the correct interpretation of the ontic implications of the logical equivalence
of qualitative and relational predication syntactical transforms, then, merely on the
strength of the logical equivalence of qualitative and relational predications,
together with any supplementary extra-logical rationale, the foundations of
metaphysics logically cannot be reduced to qualities without relations, or to
relations without qualities, but qualities and relations logically are equally
fundamental.
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Thus, we shall finally argue in support of a contrary interpretation of the logical
equivalence of qualitative and relational predications:
(I:2) SYNTACTICAL-TO-ONTIC ANTI-REDUCTIONISM
Q $ R implies that R-entities exist iff R-entities exist, and hence that neither is ontically dispensable
in deference to the other
An ontology of properties logically cannot be reduced from an ontic domain containing both Q- and
R-entities, to a domain containing only Q- and no R-entities, or, alternatively, to a ontic domain
containing only R- and no Q-entities
2 Abstraction Equivalences for Qualitative and Relational Predications
To provide an ontic reduction of qualities to relations, we begin with a stereotypical
quality expression of the simplest predicational logical form, Fa. Then we show
how to reduce it by the method of k-abstraction to produce a (vacuously) relational
expression in logically equivalent form.2
We assume the following sense of syntactical to ontic reduction:
ONTIC REDUCTION (OR)
Vx,y[OR(x) = y $ [x = y ^ VF1 AF2[F1 = F2 ^ [F1(x) ? F2(y)]]]]
The idea is that x is ontically reducible to distinct y iff any truth we want to
express about x logically implies in different terms a corresponding truth about
y. The relevant application for the reduction of properties exclusively to qualities or
relations is that in which x is a quality (relation) and y is a relation (quality), F1(x) is
a qualitative (relational) predication, and F2(y) is a distinct relational (qualitative)
predication. We show below that a similarly generalized ontic reductive transfor-
mation of qualitative to relational predications is also attainable. The same principle
of ontic reduction, in two applications covering both reduction directions, implies
not only that relations are ontically reducible to qualities, but that qualities are
ontically reducible to relations.
We illustrate the use of k-abstraction in conjunction with the principle of ontic
reduction for the case in which proposition p = Object a has quality F and object a
has quality G; in elementary predicate logic, p = Fa ^ Ga. Where p is an open
sentence with every object variable x unbound, the k-abstract of p,
kx[p] = kx[Fx ^ Gx]a. Now instead of predicating property F and property G of
object a, in a truth functional conjunction of separate predications, we can attach in
2 See note 5 below. Standard solutions are to restrict iterative syntax constructions by type theory
orderings, to wffs already derived within a proof structure from logical theorems, or by making
k-abstraction conditional on the non-implication of syntactical inconsistency.
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one single predication the k-abstracted property of being F-and-G of object
a. Predicate abstraction now permits logical equivalences to be expressed between
relations and qualities. Using k-abstraction, relation terms can be logically
equivalently expressed exclusively by means of quality terms, and conversely.3
Qualities are properties expressed as one-argument-place predicates, as when we
write Fa, saying that object a has quality F. Relations are properties expressed by
more-than-one-argument-place predicates, as when we write, Rab or aRb, meaning
that object a stands in relation R to object b. Nor is there any reason to suppose that
two-place relations exhaust the field. Between-ness requires three terms, as do many
other relations, and indefinitely more argument place relational terms might be
needed, even for the logic of everyday relational concepts, such as being the cousin
of the nephew of an uncle of the sister of an aunt. As Wittgenstein rightly remarks,
asking rhetorically in Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus 5.5541: ‘How could we
decide a priori whether, for example, I can get into a situation in which I need to
symbolize with a sign of a 27-termed relation?’4
A naı¨ve formulation for k-abstraction equivalence in the predicationally most
basic case states, schematically: Vx[[…x…] $ ky[…y…]x]. As a topic for another
occasion, abstraction is so powerful that restrictions must be placed on its naı¨ve
formulation to avoid the abstraction of logically self-contradictory predicates.5
Type-related syntax restrictions that forbid abstraction from such paradoxical
symbol combinations as xx or FF (since object x cannot fail to be a property F), are
already in force in classical predicate-quantificational logic, and in any case they do
not apply to the elementary first-order logic to which we confine immediate
attention. Equally, we can restrict k-abstraction to formulas that have appeared
within the course of a derivation, and are not merely chosen at random as merely
constructible wffs (well-formed formulas) or permissible syntax combinations, or
only those that do not imply a syntactical inconsistency, or the like, as considered
logical practice may recommend. We proceed on the assumption that the conditions
needed to avoid logical inconsistency from paradoxical inferences involving
k-abstraction are satisfied in the relevant applications. For convenience, we think of
k-abstraction equivalence naı¨vely as above wherever it does not threaten contra-
diction. The first such equivalence states:
Fa $ kx Fx½ a
Here there occurs a qualitative expression on both sides of the biconditional,
signifying that this use of k-abstraction is not yet categorically logically reductive,
let alone the expression of or justification for a corresponding ontic reduction.
3 Church (1941), Barendregt (1984).
4 Wittgenstein (1922).
5 One form of the naı¨ve abstraction paradox proceeds by the following derivation:
Z = kx[xx]
Vx[[…x…] $ ky[…y…]x]
ZZ v :ZZ
ZZ ? [kx[xx]Z ? :ZZ]
:ZZ ? [kx[xx]Z ? :ZZ] ? ZZ]
ZZ $ :ZZ.
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We nevertheless progress by stages from this unassuming starting place eventually
to reach an explicitly relational logically equivalent formula. We note that the
qualitative predication is logically equivalent to an existential predication involving
a truth functional and identity relation:
Fa $ 9x½Fx ^ x ¼ a
Conjunction as a truth-functional relation, ^, and the identity relation, =, at this
early stage of effecting a reductive transformation of a qualitative to a relational
expression, are already incorporated in the formalization. To make the identity
relation and relational expressions more explicit, we rewrite the open sentence with
free variable x in x = a as Ixa or = xa, = (x, a), etc. Less conventionally, we can
do the same for conjunction, ^, as a truth-functional relation.6
(PUTATIVE) ONTIC ‘REDUCTION’ OF QUALITIES TO RELATIONS
VIA LOGICAL EQUIVALENCE
Fa $ Ax[kykz[Fy ^ y = z]xa]
Vx[Fx $ Ay[kzkw[Fz ^ z = w]x,y]]
Applying k-abstraction eqivalence produces a wff explicitly containing a more
generalizable two-place relational predication. From this, in turn, by a comple-
mentary abstraction, we immediately obtain a more-than-one-argument-place
relational logical equivalence to the original one-argument-place qualitative
predication, Fa.
We read the order of terms in the case of Rab from left to right, meaning
that object a has relation R to b, rather than that b has relation R to a. By naı¨ve
k-abstraction, the existentially bound variable ‘x’ takes y’s place within the
k-abstraction, and constant ‘a’ takes z’s place. The result is to derive the logically
equivalent, manifestly internally relational expression, Ax[Fx ^ x = a], from which
the logically equivalent two-argument-place externally relational expression is
abstracted. Similarly, we interpret k-abstracted relation kxky[Ryx]ba as logically
equivalent to Rba rather than Rab, because of the left-to-right order in which
argument places are allocated within the k-abstraction relation term, and matching
the left-to-right order of object terms satisfying the abstracted relational predicate.
To say that Rab under the same convention, we would need to formalize the relation
by the left-to-right convention, either as kxky[Ryx]ab or kxky[Rxy]ab.
We have seen that we can reduce qualities to relations in the sense of providing
logical equivalences of qualitative to relational predications. Now we pursue the
k-abstraction reduction of qualities and relations in the opposite direction, this time
6 The reduction Fa $ Ax[Fx ^ x = a] does not hold in free logic, where we would need to supplement
the equivalence with the proposition that the name- or constant-designated object exists,
[Fa ^ E!a] $ Ax[Fx ^ x = a]. The argument has been that even in classical logic we can syntactically
reduce qualitative or one-argument-place predications to expanded relational or more-than-one-argument-
place predications, which holds true also in the free logic variant, where both Fa and E!a are qualitative
predications, and Ax[Fx ^ x = a] in its second conjunct is relational.
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from relations to qualities, taking as our example a simplest standard relational
predication of the form Rab. An adequate semantics must allow for whatever truth-
conditions are needed for Rab. The question is whether the truth-conditions for
explicitly relational predications must assume the existence of relations like R. Are
relational predications capable of being paraphrased away instead, and in that sense
reduced to qualitative predications? Can we say logically exactly what we want to
say when we assert that Rab, without supposing that there exists a relation R? We
can do so, according to the interpretation we have been criticizing, if and only if
there is a logical equivalence between Rab and another one-argument-place
predication. Intuitively, the equivalence is affirmed in saying that a is R-related to
b if and only if b has the quality of being R-related-to-a. We then have at most a
relational quality, but not a quality-irreducible relation as a category unto itself. We
avail ourselves of k-abstraction devices once again in order to reduce an ostensibly
relational predication to a logically equivalent syntactically qualitative predication.
What are the possibilities of expressing relations as qualities in a sufficiently
enriched logical notation supplemented by abstraction devices?
The difference between the relevant qualitative and relational predications is
syntactically whether the predicate in question is satisfied by one or more than one
argument, completed by one or more than one constant or quantifier-bound variable.
We introduce the following logical equivalence, whereby the difference between
qualities and relations appears to amount to nothing more or less than a stylistic
preference for one mode of expression rather than another. The equivalence states:
(PUTATIVE) ONTIC ‘REDUCTION’ OF RELATIONS TO QUALITIES
VIA LOGICAL EQUIVALENCE
Rab $ kx[Rax]b
Vx1…xn[Rx1…xn-1xn $ ky1…yn-1[Ry1…yn-1]xn]
We merely rename the abstracted property kx[Rax] = F (the relational quality of
being R-related-to-a), in order subsequently to derive:
Rab $ Fb
where ontic reductions of qualities to and from relations are considered, there is not
merely a conditional relation, but a logical equivalence, between qualitative and
relational predications. Invoking the previous definition of syntactical to ontic
reduction, it follows logically both that:
R?Q
OR(quality-a) = relation-b $ [quality-a = relation-
b ^ VF1AF2[F1 = F2 ^ [(qualitative predication) F1(a) ?
(relational predication) F2(b)]]]
And:
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Q?R
OR(relation-b) = quality-a $ [quality-a = relation-b
^ VF1AF2[F1 = F2 ^ [(relational predication) F2(b) ? (qualitative predication)
F1(a)]]]
It would then appear that:
OR(relation-b) = quality-a $ OR(quality-a) = relation-b
Vx, y[OR(relation-y) = quality-x $ OR(quality-x) = relation-y]
Finally, returning to the inference of the central argument, representing in
functional notation the logical equivalence of qualitative and relational predications:
8x9y OR relation  xð Þ ¼ quality  y½  ^ 8x9y OR quality  xð Þ ¼ relation  y½ 
As proved in the case of proposition p = All triangles have 4 sides, and q = All
squares have 5 sides, we know in general that::Vx, y[[x $ y] ? x = y]. What, then,
of the specific case in which p = Fa, and q = Ax[kykz[Fy ^ y = z]xa], or where
p = Rab, and q = kx[Rax]b? Are these reductive instances, where ontically p = q,
simply because logically p $ q? Or are they like the above counterexample, in which
truth functional equivalence is not sufficient for propositional identity, syntactically
or semantically? If qualitative and relational predications are identical by virtue of
being logically equivalent, then we may merely have two different ways, qualitative
and relational, of predicating a property to an object or objects. Ontically, we would
have only the one existent property rather than both a quality and a relation in
the metaphysics’ minimal ontology and logic’s minimal semantic domain. If the
propositions are the same, then there would seem to be good grounds for concluding
that the corresponding qualities and relations are also ontically identical, although
capable of syntactically distinct logically equivalent predication forms.
3 Ontic Implications of Quality-Relation Logical Equivalences
The truth of a logical equivalence between qualitative and relational predications is
best explained as entailing what may at first seem to be two colliding, but on
reflection perfectly compossible, ontic and logical or semantic propositions. As a
contribution to the logic and metaphysics of properties, we accordingly propose:
(a) An ontology of properties, insofar as we recognize a distinction between
one-argument-place and more-than-one-argument-place predications, logically
must contain both qualities and relations. Wherever we try to speak of only
qualities or only relations, we are trumped in our efforts at ontic parsimony by
the logical equivalence of any qualitative predication with some relational
predication, and conversely.
Logical equivalence remains in force regardless of the extra-logical consider-
ations that might incline theory toward qualities as more fundamental than relations,
or the reverse. In the present application, the subordination of the truths of
metaphysics to the truths of logic implies that, wherever a quality is spoken of in
formulating ontological principles, including the principle that there exist only
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qualities, there a logically equivalent relation is also expressed. The equivalence
holds as a transcendent truth of logic, with metaphysics like everything else fully in
its jurisdiction, even if the resources for such explicit discourse have been excluded
from a designated logic or language expressing the metaphysics of properties, and
in spite of the agreed upon fact that ontic commitments are always made by the
acceptance of certain propositions. The same applies for the contrary proposal that
there exist only relations, any mention of which is logically equivalent to a
corresponding qualitative predication.
The logical equivalence of qualitative and relational predications can then
alternatively be interpreted as logically implying that there are qualities wherever
there are relations, and vice versa. It follows that neither category of qualities nor
relations can rightly be considered as ontically more primitive or foundational than
the other, and neither qualities nor relations can be made the one and only ontically
reductive property category. The preferred interpretation rejects both collapsing the
set of all properties into the set of all qualities minus all relations, or into the set of
relations with no qualities. The qualities, logically speaking, to which ontology
refers, at a higher logical court of appeal than metaphysics, are already relations,
no matter how we may have limited our terminology, and the relations are already
qualities. As a matter of logical equivalence, of the logical necessity expressed and
logically implied by a tautology, we must always have both categories of qualities
and relations in the ontology of properties wherever we have either one. This
conclusion also applies to ‘reductive’ systematizations of property ontologies that
try to make do, on the basis of the logical equivalence of qualitative and relational
predications, by referring only to qualities to the exclusion of relations, or to
relations excluding all qualities, contrary even to the powerful principle of logically
equivalent syntactical-to-ontic reduction under criticism.
Despite (a), however, the preferred interpretation of the logical equivalence of
qualitative and relational predications also logically implies:
(b) Whenever we need to speak of either qualities or relations, we can choose for
an unpredetermined range of extra-logical reasons to speak exclusively of
qualities and never of relations, or of relations and never of qualities.
Remarkably, as with (a) above, this includes ‘reductive’ systematizations of
property ontologies that, in the spirit of ontic reductionism, refer only to qualities to
the exclusion of relations, or to relations excluding qualities, and where a reductive
theory of properties mentions only qualities or only relations. The point of (a) and
(b) implied by the proposed reinterpretation, as (b) advises, is that we can choose to
ignore relations in favor of qualities, or qualities in favor of relations. In articulating
an ontology of properties, if it suits our purposes, we can codify metaphysical
principles in terms of one category of properties rather than another, by making
reference exclusively to qualities rather than relations, or to relations in preference
to qualities. We should be cautioned in so doing, that, as (a) asserts, we do not
thereby achieve an ontic reduction of relations to qualities or qualities to relations.
We cannot determine what exists or does not exist merely by electing to use a purely
qualitative versus relational or relational versus qualitative predicational vocabu-
lary. Instead, both qualitative and relational predications are logically guaranteed
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to be intersubstitutable salva veritate in any extensional context in which either
choice of terminology occurs.
This is also how we might best interpret the reductive syntactical choices
available as a consequence of the propositional tautology previously mentioned,
[p ? q] $ [:p _ q]. Here too we may choose to eliminate ? in favor of _ and :
(or the reverse) in a comparatively more economical logical syntax, while
recognizing on the basis of the logical equivalence that, in a sufficiently
expressively rich language, whenever we have the material conditional, for
example, so have we also disjunction and negation, and conversely. Entities
belonging to one metaphysical category are ontically reduced to another if and only
if a true logical equivalence justifies our decreasing the number of things or types of
things to which a theory is ontically committed. To reduce qualities to relations or
relations to qualities is literally to reduce the total ontology of properties from two
subcategories, qualities and relations, exclusively to either qualities or relations, the
one in some sense subsuming the other. If qualities are just limiting cases of
relations, then we need only suppose that there are relations; whereas if relations are
all equivalently expressible as qualitative predications, then we need only suppose
that there are qualities.
The limits of logical expression as such offer a window on what is minimally
needed in a metaphysics of truth conditions for true and false propositions. Logic
presupposes propositions in which properties are truly or falsely (or otherwise)
predicated of objects. These properties, we often assume, can be either qualities or
relations, distinguished syntactically by virtue of possessing a logical form in which
exactly one or more than one object term is included when the property is predicated
of the object or objects in the language. As we have seen, there exist logical
equivalences within classical logic union standard k-abstraction theory by which
any qualitative expression is logically equivalent to a corresponding relational
expression, and conversely. There is, moreover, an apparent gain in ontic parsimony
if we can justifiably reduce qualities to relations or relations to qualities in an
interesting sense, for then properties generally are simply qualities or simply
relations.
But which way should it go? We might take the biconditional’s truth to represent
a type of logical freedom. Perhaps, if we can find good extra-logical grounds for
preferring one conditional pointing in one direction over the other within the
equivalence, then the equivalence permits us to justify the choice of reducing
qualities to relations or relations to qualities. We simply discount one of the
component conditionals, one-half of the logical equivalence of qualitative and
relational predications, on extra-logical grounds, reduce it logically to the other, and
thereby lay the groundwork for a metaphysics of properties consisting only of
qualities or only of relations. We do so, moreover, while acknowledging that
logically things could go either way, in the sense that we are satisfied for reasons
consistent with but external to logic itself to accept a metaphysics of properties in
which qualities are collapsed into relations, or relations into qualities.
By formalizing a logical equivalence between qualitative and relational
predications, we may think that we can either eliminate qualities in favor of
relations or relations in favor of qualities. Logic appears to let us choose on
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extra-logical grounds whichever reduction we may prefer in advancing a more
austere properties ontology. Why not, if reductions in both directions are logically
authorized? Although ontology may in some sense be formally dependent on logic,
we never suppose that logic alone entails any of the juicy content of ontology,
whether God exists or universals, or the like. We imagine that something more
substantive than logic, the stuff of metaphysics with definite commitments as to the
nature of existence, must be added to logic in order to make progress in ontology.
If this is true, then perhaps we could begin to make a first stand for one logically
permissible foundational metaphysical truth rather than its alternative by choosing
qualities as ontically more fundamental than relations, and eliminating relations
except as special cases of qualities from the ontology of properties. Or just the
opposite, if we decide that relations are ontically more fundamental than qualities,
eliminating qualities as merely one-argument-place limiting cases of relations. Here,
in either event, we say something explicit about the world, with logic to support us
insofar as there exists a logical equivalence between any qualitative predication and
a corresponding relational predication.
As a final objection, consider that if we interpret the logical equivalence of
qualitative and relational predications as meaning that there are both qualities and
relations in even the most highly reduced logical domain of properties, then we
appear to be saddled with double the number of truth-makers for such predications,
as opposed to adopting the ontically reductive interpretation of their logical
equivalence. The answer seems to be that in such situations we have only one truth-
maker, but, since the truth-maker can be expressed either as the exemplification of a
quality or relation by an object or objects, it follows that our theory, analysis, or
metaphysical understanding of the relevant truth-makers, where ontic commitments
are determined, logically implies the existence of both qualities and relations as
property subcategories.
4 Qualities as Relations or Relations as Qualities
We now consider a selection of the extra-logical arguments that might be given for
reducing relations to qualities, rather than qualities to relations, and the reverse. It is
tempting to regard qualities as logically and ontically simpler or formally or
conceptually more primitive than relations, thereby favoring the reduction of
relations to qualities, including relational qualities, for at least two reasons:
(1) Qualities are minimally expressible only as one-argument-place predicates,
and relations are generally expressible as more-than-one-argument-place
predicates. Relations so explained seem like complicated qualities, or as
compressed ways of expressing ideas about the property of an object as it
stands in relation to itself or more typically another object. As such, relations
are ontically speaking a special subcategory of qualities.
(2) Reducing relations to qualities is syntactically more elegant than reducing
qualities to relations, because it involves only one step of k-abstraction,
whereas the reduction of qualitative to relational predications appears more
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conspicuously a matter of vacuous syntax tricks, with two overlapping
k-abstractions needed to formalize an object a having a certain quality F as an
object related to an object a explicitly said to be identical or identity-related to
a. Why would anyone bother, except for the most abstract theoretical reasons
in advancing a minimal property ontology?
What weight should be given such extra-logical quasi-aesthetic considerations in
preferring the reduction of relations to qualities rather than the other way around.
Do we simply adopt the prettier, subjectively more elegant, or ‘intuitively
appealing’, of the available reductions?
Where logic seems to offer a choice of alternative reductions, provided that we
can find a good reason outside of logic for preferring one reduction over another, we
might find it preferable also metaphysically to consider that qualities are more basic
than relations, and that relational predications are just expanded more-than-one-
argument place formulations of one-argument-place qualitative predications. Why
not start with qualities as the simplest cases of predication, and then build up to
logically more complex relations? That of itself would be one thing, but the ontic
reduction proposes not merely that in our metaphysics of properties we transition
logically from qualities to relations (and relations to qualities), via the inter-
transformability of qualitative and relational predications, but that in the process
qualities (relations) ontically swallow up relations (qualities) as special cases of
qualities (relations), so that in reality there are only qualities (relations).
Giving logical and ontic preference to qualities over relations, or the opposite,
despite the force of (1) and (2), can be brought to doubt. For this, we need only be
troubled (3) by the implication that in either case we have thereby actually reduced
the logical structure of a more-than-one-argument-place predication to a condensed,
precisely one-argument-place predication, when the internal logical structure of the
facilitating k-abstract essentially contains the original more-than-one-argument-
place predicate from which it is constructed. Can we so easily change what exists or
does not exist merely by playing with syntax? Have we truly eliminated what is
essentially relational from relational predications, and thereby purged relations
generally from ontology, when the beginning more-than-one-argument-place
relational content of such a predication continues to appear explicitly in the
corresponding logically equivalent k-abstracted one-argument-place quality pred-
ication? If we say that object b has the quality of being R-related-to-a, then we are
referring to an explicitly relational quality, and we have not totally eliminated either
relations or the concept of a relation from ontology, thought and discourse, or from
logic and language in the abstract.
Why, otherwise, would anyone want to formalize Fa as Ax[kykz[Fy ^ y = z]xa],
or Rab as kx[Rax]b? We might choose to do so in the first instance for philosophical
purposes in order to reflect the thought that object a exists, where the existential
quantifier is extensionally interpreted as having ontic import, ranging over a domain
of existing objects only, and capable in each instance of being named as individuals
by means of object constants. This is not a trivial commitment, even if widely
accepted by contemporary logicians, and one well worth articulating and critically
evaluating in detail, because, where the same principles as above apply, we shall not
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expect the same logical equivalence to hold when F = is a detective and
a = Sherlock Holmes (or a = Zeus and F = is a great meteorological god; etc.).
If we want those kinds of predications to come out true, then we must modify
standard issue extensional semantics for symbolic logic to permit the naming,
quantification over, and true predication of properties, to nonexistent objects like
Zeus and Sherlock Holmes, and Meinong’s (actually, Berkeley’s and Hume’s)
golden mountain and even more notorious round square.7
We learn from the logical equivalences of qualitative and relational predications
that there may be no answer within logic to the question whether qualities and the
exemplification of qualities are metaphysically more fundamental than relations and
the exemplification of relations. Shall we say that relations ontically build on and
are defined in terms of qualities, or the reverse? Do A and B exemplify the relation
of being similarly red-colored because both exemplify the quality of being red, or
are both A and B red because they bear to one another the relation of being similarly
red-colored? What is the right thing to say? In asking these questions, we begin to
uncover some of the deepest roots of the metaphysical realism versus nominalism
controversy. Logic, by itself, unfortunately, does not answer any of these questions,
but permits us at least to formulate them univocally and with unusual clarity, and
to present us with a single powerful logical equivalence that, together with the
assumed ontic reduction principle, simultaneously ‘reduces’ both qualities to
relations and relations to qualities.
Taking relations as more fundamental than qualities, on the other hand, and
incorporating qualities as limiting cases of relations, in some ways more obviously
and immediately handles all the limitless numbers of relations, and may fit more
comfortably with a relativistic standpoint in philosophy and physics. It is
nevertheless hard to overlook the fact or discount the impression that there is
something highly artificial about the inclusion of qualities as limiting cases of
relations. To accomplish such an expansive ‘reduction’, we must add vacuously
relational clauses to the original expression of the exemplification of a quality in
order to make it formally relational, which seems suspiciously ham-fisted. The
above line of argument represents a serious challenge to the proposition that many-
argument-place relations are more basic because more universal than one-argument-
place qualities. What the existence then exemplifies is the possession of relations
among objects, in the limiting case of an object being related to itself. Thus, we
might propose:
8x½Fx $ 8y½Ryy $ Fy
The formula appears to represent an ontic reduction of quality-hood more
generally to an equivalent relational form, by interposing additional informationally
redundant relational argument places. If we say Fa, that object a has quality F, that
Allen is friendly, for example, or has the quality of being friendly, then, according
to the proposed equivalence, we are saying nothing other than if we were to say that
Allen has the relation R to Allen of Allen’s being friendly, Raa.
7 Berkeley (1949–1958, Vol. II, Second Dialogue, p. 224), Hume (1975, Section II, ‘Origin of Ideas’,
§13, p. 19). For additional references to philosophical literature about the golden mountain, see Jacquette
(2009, pp. 169–203).
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Philosophically, we must wonder whether cooking up such ‘relations’ is
worthwhile, in the sense of really showing that qualities can be ontically reduced to
relations by the logical equivalence of certain of their predications. Can either of
these reductions be justified as preferred, if, as in the semantic instability of the liar
paradox, taking the liar sentence by turns as false if true, and true if false, we can
always come back logically with a reduction of qualities to relations, and relations
to qualities, and logically equivalent relations again, indefinitely? It seems contrived
to reduce many-argument-place relational predications to one-argument-place
qualitative predications, or to expand one-argument-place qualitative predications
into many-argument-place relational predications, by means of k-abstraction, as
though such a reduction were logically stable, purely for the sake of gaining points
for a property ontology in which there are only qualities, or the opposite, in which
there are only relations.
Nor should we expect philosophical insight from an anthropological and
cognitive developmental standpoint, if it turns out that thinking subjects grasp the
concept of a quality before they grasp that of a relation. The stance might be further
supported externally even by the argument that individual objects are first identified
by a conceptualization, so that interrelationships among objects presuppose an
individual object’s prior possession of qualities. First, objects must have the
qualities, many a logician and metaphysician might insist, by which they are
identified and individuated one from another as objects. Only then, as particularized
objects, can they stand in relations to other particularized objects, each possessing a
distinguishing logically consistent assemblage of qualities. Such a conceptual
orientation might indeed be widely or even universally shared by all human
thinkers. By itself, however, empirical facts about human cognition do not settle
ontic questions, unless there is a plausible reason to suppose that other nonhuman
kinds of thinkers, if any should exist, could not manage their cognitive economy by
giving ontic precedence to relations over qualities, regarding them both as equi-
foundational, or simply not admitting the distinction.
5 Logic and Ontology of Qualities and Relations
The proposed philosophical recommendation is to reject interpretation (I:1) of
logical equivalence between qualitative and relational predications as offering us a
disjunctive choice of ontically reducing qualities to relations or relations to
qualities, and to adopt instead anti-reductionistic interpretation (I:2). The reasons to
be offered for preferring qualities over relations in an ontology of properties are not
very persuasive in the first place, and can predictably be met by countermanding
justifications for preferring relations over qualities, just as when instead we happen
to favor relations over qualities.
The world, on such a conception, reality as we find it and as we try to
conceptualize its most basic features, might be described as glued together by the
exemplification of properties, equivalently expressible as qualities or relations.
What is fundamental to metaphysics in either case is an ontology of properties
exemplified by objects for a domain of properties that logically includes both
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qualities and relations, alternatively and logically equivalently expressible by both
one- and more-than-one-argument place predicates. Objects have qualities and stand
in relations to themselves and other objects. Propertyhood, in the most general
sense, an object’s possession of qualities or relations, is metaphysically fundamen-
tal, even though we may have culturally evolved a special nomenclature and a
corresponding grammar and logical notation for one- and more-than-one-argument-
place property predications.
To investigate the fallacy by which the logical equivalence of quality and
relational predications implies that we can get along in the ontology of properties
exclusively with either qualities or relations as more fundamental than the other,
consider by analogy a logical formalism that asks us to accept the syntactical
convention whereby a predicate term without an object term attached is a limiting
case of zero-argument-place predication that can accordingly serve as a proposi-
tional symbol. This reduction accomplishes a neat syntactical economy. But does it
persuade us that predicates are reducible to propositions? If by full logical
equivalence we expect that a propositional symbol can be produced from a predicate
merely by attaching an object term, constant or quantifier-bound variable, then we
might think that this shows propositions to be logically or ontically more basic than
predicates or than the properties the predicates represent. The suggestion should
nevertheless be rejected, because propositions are essentially predications that
attach quality or relation predicates to object terms, whether constants or quantifier-
bound variables, whereas only special predicates contain propositions, which must
themselves in turn contain compositionally even more basic predicates.
If we try to sustain the distinction, then we can make as good a logical case,
which is to say no logically discriminating case at all, for reducing qualities to
relations or relations to qualities, as we could for saying that predicates are reducible
to propositions in a logic that defines propositions as zero-limit argument place
instances of predicates. Propositions are rightly so-called when they propose that a
certain state of affairs exists, that an object has a certain quality or stands in a certain
relation to itself or other objects. Propositions, therefore, and the sentences that
serve as truth-vehicles to express their meanings, are in every case nothing more or
less than the attribution and expression of the attribution of a property to an object
or objects. As such, propositions actually presuppose predicates representing
qualities or relations, without which there is nothing for thought to propose and
nothing to predicate of any object in any language or symbolic logic.
6 Metaphysically Foundational Property Exemplification
The moral of the story is that in logic and metaphysics we should not infer that
something is more basic than something else just because the relevant terms are found
in logically equivalent predications. That there exists a rule-governed syntactical
transformation by which definitional or truth functional logical equivalences among
categories of propositional syntax enable us to derive expressions of one logical form
to and from those of another, by itself does not imply that we are justified as a result in
‘reducing’ relations to and from qualities, as of qualities to and from relations.
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Logic does not present us with an extra-logical choice for metaphysics and the
ontology of properties in which we are free to eliminate qualities in favor of
relations or relations in favor of qualities, as (I:1) prescribes. When we try to
interpret the logical situation in this way, we find as above that we cannot arrive at
good reasons in any case for preferring to make qualities more fundamental
metaphysical building blocks than relations, or to subsume qualities as limiting
cases of ontically more fundamental relations. There are incommensurable pros and
cons on both sides of the dispute. The idea of throwing in our lot exclusively with
qualities over relations or relations over qualities in any event is doomed to failure.
The most that we are permitted is to restrict our language about properties to
formalizations involving exclusively qualitative or exclusively relational predica-
tions. The logical equivalences of qualitative and relational predications meta-
logically transcending any constrained syntax rules imply that whenever a
qualitative predication is advanced, it can be replaced in any extensional context
by a logically equivalent relational predication, and vice versa. It is not that qualities
themselves are dispensable in favor of relations or relations in deference to qualities,
but that for whatever one-argument-place quality predication we propose, there will
always be a logically equivalent more-than-one-argument-place relational predica-
tion, and conversely. Logic teaches us, not that we have the choice of going in either
direction, ontically reducing qualities to relations or relations to qualities, but rather
that whenever we may think we have hold of a quality in metaphysics, we might just
as well say that it is a relation, and that whenever we may think we have hold of a
relation, we might just as well say that it is quality.
Logical equivalences of qualitative and relational predications do not go away
just because we decide metaphysically on extra-logical grounds to promote qualities
over relations or relations over qualities. We are logically stuck in our ontology of
properties with both qualities and relations, at least insofar as we continue to
distinguish qualities from relations entirely on the number of a corresponding
predicate’s argument places. To logically reduce our talk in one way or another on
the strength of a logical equivalence is not ontically to reduce the domain of objects
about which we talk, but logically to justify an equal place for all entities under any
logically equivalent designation. The logical equivalence of qualitative and
relational predications, without further restriction, implies that to speak of qualities
is also to speak logically equivalently of relations, and that to speak of relations is
also to speak equivalently of qualities. The situation in which we recognize
qualitative and relational predication forms as logically equivalent and interdefin-
able is analogous to the choice in a Euclidean geometry of defining lines as the
shortest connection of two distinct points versus defining points as the intersection
of two distinct lines. We would not propose in geometry that if we define lines in
terms of points that therefore points are more fundamental than lines, since we can
always turn the argument around by observing that the equivalence permits us also
and with equal justice to define points in terms of lines. We are equally freighted in
Euclidean geometry with both points and lines as equi-fundamental, just as we are
in metaphysics with both qualities and relations in the ontology of properties. And
for precisely the same reason: because, respectively, the two sets of concepts are
logically interdefinable.
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We can attempt to reduce our talk about properties exclusively to qualities
without relations, or to relations excluding qualities. The logical equivalence of
qualitative and relational expressions is nevertheless not nullified by our extra-
logical motivations, but, energetic reductionist rhetoric notwithstanding, implies
instead that ontically we always have qualities wherever we have relations, and
conversely. There are no extra-logical reasons for preferring or rejecting one-half of
a logical equivalence that ontically overpowers the logical force of a logical
equivalence itself. To suppose otherwise is the wrong way to think about the
existence of a logical equivalence between qualitative and relational predications,
and the relation of logic to ontology. The equivalence does not license us to pick
and choose on extra-logical grounds one direction of the equivalence over the other,
as some logically oriented ontologists seem to believe. Instead, the equivalence
prevails in either case, meaning that we cannot do away with either of the
equivalents. It is a theorem of predicate-quantificational logic with k-abstraction, a
tautology of that logical system, that qualitative and relational predications are
logically mutually inter-derivable, and hence that logically qualities and relations
are always co-present.
We thus encounter a basic form of the positive correspondence model of truth, of
the truth of a proposition describing the exemplification of a quality by an object
with the actual state of affairs in which the object actually exemplifies the quality.
We expect a positive correspondence between the truth-condition requirements for a
correct ontology and the existence conditions of the actual or any logically possible
world. Actuality is actuality, and we would not have it any other way. However, we
can say something more substantive when we assert that it is the actual
exemplification of properties by existent objects that constitutes the actual world.
In grasping the most elementary truth conditions of true and false propositions, we
touch on something deeply metaphysical, an object exemplifying properties as the
most basic constituent of real existence. It is the state of affairs of an object
exemplifying, possessing, or its being true of the object that the object, has a
particular property, quality or relation, that is the ultimate cornerstone of existence,
and hence of any adequate theoretical ontology, in a complete and correct
metaphysics. We can go no further when we have reached this point, the possession
by an object of a property, to paraphrase the later Wittgenstein, but our spade is
turned against metaphysical bedrock.8
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